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I. INTRODUCTION
0N AUGUST 25, 1994, America West Airlines emerged from
a three-yeari stay in bankruptcy court.' This day marked the
first time in the 1990s that none of the nation's major airlines
1 America West Emerges from Bankruptcy, L.A. TiMEs, Aug. 26, 1994, at D2 [herein-
after L.A. TIMES].
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were under Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.2 Does this mean
the major airlines are no longer threatened with bankruptcy?
Hardly. The airline industry is still in rather poor shape.3 A re-
turn to Chapter 11 protection for some of the weaker airlines is
just a recession or fuel crisis away.4
Despite the positive economic news that all major airlines are
out of bankruptcy, Chapter 11 protection for airlines remains an
important issue. Bankruptcy of airlines has been a newsworthy
topic since industry deregulation in 1978. Of particular interest
has been the large number of airlines seeking bankruptcy pro-
tection, and the length of time they stayed in Chapter 11. Bran-
iff, Pan Am, Eastern, Continental, TWA, Midway, and America
West have all filed for bankruptcy since 1978-the list reads like
the roll call for the airline hall of fame. Besides being some of
the most successful U.S. airlines at one time or another, they
also share the dubious honor of undergoing the Chapter 11 ex-
periences. Some of these airlines were able to reorganize into
more efficient operators.5 Others are dead and buried, only to
be revived in the annals of the U.S. airline industry. 6 Two air-
lines became so familiar with Chapter 11 that they decided to
return for a second visit.7
2 Id.
3 The U.S. airline industry lost $10 billion from 1990 to 1992 and "is only now
showing signs of partial fitful and inadequate recovery." THE NATIONAL COMMIS-
SION TO ENSURE A STRONG COMPETITIVE AIRLINE INDUSTRY, CHANGE, CHALLENGE
AND COMPETITION, 2 (1993) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT]. "This [loss] ex-
ceeds all the profits the industry has realized from its inception." H.R. REP. No.
22, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 83 [hereinafter
HOUSE REPORT].
4 "In four of the first ten deregulation years, the industry as a whole operated
at a net loss." Michael A. Katz, The American Experience Under the Airline Deregula-
tion Act of 1978-An Airline Perspective, 6 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 87, 96 (1988). In 1987
the industry recorded net profit margin of only 1.1%, very low by American busi-
ness standards. Id.
5 Continental emerged from Chapter 11 in April 1993. America West
emerged in 1994. L.A. TIMES, supra note 1, at D2.
6 Eastern lasted in Chapter 11 for three years and went out of business in 1991.
Pan Am went out of business in 1991 after filing for bankruptcy in the same year.
Midway failed in 1991. Id.
7 Continental Airlines entered Chapter 11 in 1983, emerged in 1986, re-en-
tered in 1990, and emerged for the second time in 1993. Id. Braniff filed for
Chapter 11 in 1982, emerged in 1984, and filed for bankruptcy protection again
in 1989. Athanassios Papaioannou, The Duty to Bargain and Rejection of Collective
Agreements Under Section 1113 by a Bankrupt Airline Trying to Reconcile R.L.A. with
Bankruptcy Code, 18 TRANSP. L.J. 219, 220-21 n.17 (1990). That same year, Braniff
put itself on the auction block and never resumed operations again as Braniff
1018
1996] AIRLINE BANKRUPTCY 1019
Most segments of American society are touched in some way
or another by airline bankruptcy.8 From pilots to passengers,
baggage handlers to business travelers, a large percentage of the
American population is affected. Because air travel is such an
essential part of American society,9 and airlines employ so many
people,"0 it is headline news every time an airline files for Chap-
ter 11.
Airline bankruptcies produce headlines for another reason.
The ongoing debate among those within the airline industry is
whether Chapter 11 protection affords bankrupt airlines too
many unfair operating advantages and thus contributes to the
financial woes of the industr. 11 Airlines not in bankruptcy pro-
tection argue that Chapter 11 airlines are allowed to defer debt
payments and cut labor costs by breaking union agreements,
while the viable airlines must compete without these advan-
tages. 12 The viable airlines also argue that Chapter 11 airlines
are allowed unfair advantages, such as lower operating costs,
over too long a period of time."5 Meanwhile, the Chapter 11
airlines dispute these contentions.1 4 They argue that there are
major disadvantages to Chapter 11, "such as the need to make
cash payments, and consumer resistance.""5 They contend that
Airways (although a different management group resumed under the name
Braniff International Airlines, operations were again suspended in 1993). Id.
8 Worldwide, travel and tourism is a $3 trillion annual business "employing
approximately 127 million people and providing tax revenues exceeding $300
billion." COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 5.
9 Tourism, much of which depends upon air travel, is among the top three
employers in 37 states and employs 8% of the total population. Tourism also
contributes 6.4% of the gross domestic product. Id. Airports serving the 30 larg-
est metropolitan areas in the U.S. "generate more than $250 billion in economic
activity, $80 billion in wages and four million in direct and indirect jobs." Id.
10 From 1982 to 1992, airline employment increased by 64% to 540,000 peo-
ple. Id. -
11 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 3, 1993 U.S.S.C.A.N. 85. "One important
task of the Commission will be to resolve a major area of disagreement among
the expert witnesses-at the hearings concerning the extent to which airlines in
Chapter 11 bankruptcy are responsible for the industry's financial problems.
This disagreement led to substantial disagreements over recommendations for
legislative adtion." Id. at 4, 1993 U.S.S.C.A.N. 86.
12 See, e.g., Thomas W. Gerdel & Sandra Livingston, Bankruptcy Laws Create Un-
fair Competition, Airline Says, CLEVELANiD PLAIN DEALER, June 4, 1992, at 2D (refer-
encing complaints by industry leader American Airlines); Asra Q. Nomani, Sr. &
Bridget O'Brian, Healthy Airlines Lash Out at Their Struggling Rivals, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 17, 1992, at B4.
13 Nomani & O'Brian, supra note 12, at B4.
14 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 4, 1993 U.S.S.C.A.N. 86.
15 Id.
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the stronger airlines still hold the overall advantage and that the
extra time is necessary for a proper recovery.16 This debate is
unresolved and remains an area of major disagreement. 7
This Comment discusses, the extensive use of Chapter 11 pro-
tection in the airline industry. Part II begins with a short history
of the Chapter 11 proliferation in the airline industry, detailing
the two major causes, deregulation and the recent worldwide
recession. Part III provides an overview of the Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy code and relevant case law involving airlines. Part IV ad-
dresses the complaints lodged by both sides in the debate over
the widespread use of Chapter 11 and its effects on the airline
industry. Part V includes a summary of expert opinions, both
for and against changes to the bankruptcy laws.
II. CAUSES OF AIRLINE BANKRUPTCY: A
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
That airlines have gone bankrupt or spent time in Chapter 11
reorganization should come as no surprise. Since the airline in-
dustry developed in the 1920s and 1930s, a number of airlines
have collapsed due to competition, economic recessions, and in-
dustry scandals.18 More than 120 airlines have gone bankrupt 9
since the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.21 In the post-der egu-
lation era there have been two major waves of Chapter 11 filings
by airlines. The first was a product of the Deregulation Act it-
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 See Katz, supra note 4, at 87, 94-95, 100. During the development of the
industry as a means of intercity passenger travel, some scandals surfaced in .the
award of airmail contracts by the U.S. Post Office. All of the contracts were can-
celled in 1934 by order of President Roosevelt, and "the job of flying the mail was
assigned to the Army Air Corps." Exec. Order No. 6591 (1934); see Katz, supra
note 4, at 87. "The economic losses which resulted almost brought about the
demise of the airline industry," but a later decision again assigned the job of
airmail delivery to the private sector, though in a more regulated environment.
Id. See also Lawrence E. Gesell & Martin T. Farris, Airline Deregulation: An Evalua-
tion of Goals and Objectives, 21 TRANS. L.J. 105, 114 (1992).
19 Papaioannou, supra note 7, at 220. Of the 22 new major carriers which en-
tered the industry after deregulation, all but one have disappeared. HOUSE RE-
PORT, supra note 3, at 2, 1993 U.S.S.C.A.N. 84.
20 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95,504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified
as amended in scattered. sections of 49 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Deregulation Act].
For legislative history see H.R. REP. No. 1211, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3737.
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self.2 1 The second resulted from a combination of the 1990-91
economic recession and higher fuel prices brought on by the
Gulf War.22 These two major trends are developed below.
A. TBE DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978
In 1978 Congress acted to deregulate the airline industry for
the first time in fifty years .2  A number of major policy goals
supported the Deregulation Act,24 but the overall objective was
to "return the industry to competitive capitalism with many com-
peting airlines, where none could control the market and where
all would have to actively participate in price competition."25
Several of the enumerated goals cited in the Deregulation Act
specifically mention "competition. 26
Prior to deregulation, the airline industry was carefully con-
trolled by the federal government.2 7 The government regulated
the number of airlines and the routes these airlines could fly.
28
Certification through the Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA),
later renamed the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), was required
for operation.2 9 New airlines could be added to the industry
only on the basis of proving a need for their services.3 0 Conse-
21 Major airlines filing for bankruptcy protection during this time included
Braniff (in 1982), Continental (in 1983), Air Florida (in 1984), and Frontier (in
1986). Papaioannou, supra note 7, at 220.
22 Major airlines filing during this period included: Eastern (in 1989), Conti-
nental (in 1990-for the second time), Pan American (in 1991), TWA (in 1992),
Midway (in 1991), and America West (in 1991). L.A. TIMES, supra note 1, at D2.
23 The first comprehensive law passed by Congress to regulate the economic
and safety interests of airlines was the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No.
706, 52 Stat. 973, 49 U.S.C. §§ 401-722 (establishing the Civil Aeronautics Author-
ity, which became the present day Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)), repealed by
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958) (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1958)). See Katz, supra note 4, at 88; COM-
MISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 4.
24 The goals behind the Deregulation Act include: maintaining safety as the
top priority; allowing market forces to predominate; developing/maintaining a
sound regulatory scheme; preventing unfair trade practices; encouraging new en-
trants into the industry; and maintaining service in the smaller markets. Deregu-
lation Act, supra note 20, § 102, 92 Stat. at 1706-07.
25 Gesell & Farris, supra note 18, at 108.
26 Deregulation Act, supra note 20, § 102, 92 Stat. at 1706-07.
27 The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was the administrative agency responsi-
ble for regulating the airline industry. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
28 Katz, supra note 4, at 87-88.
29 Id. at 88.
s0 Id. Airlines had to prove that their proposed service would serve "the public
convenience and necessity." See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, supra note 23,
§ 401(d), 72 Stat. at 755.
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quently, regulation limited the number of airlines in the indus-
try.31 Fares were also strictly regulated. Passenger ticket prices
had to be approved by the CAB, based on cost projections pro-
vided by the airlines.32 The regulatory scheme tended to favor
the status quo and discourage competition, and for the airlines
lucky enough to be in existence, regulation provided a fairly
comfortable operating environment.
The Deregulation Act, however, brought drastic changes.
New airlines entered the industry to challenge the existing carri-
ers. Prior to deregulation, new entrants had to prove their pro-
posed service would serve "the public convenience and
necessity. ' 33 Today a new entrant need only show that "it can
meet minimum standards of operational and financial responsi-
bility."34 The burden of proof has shifted from the parties pro-
posing service to the parties' opposing new service. 3' Whereas
thirty-six airlines were in existence prior to deregulation, 134
new airlines formed in the first six years after deregulation. 6
Airlines are now allowed to compete for new markets previously
limited to only a handful of airlines. 7 Airlines are free to set
their own rates.3 8 The airline that operates more efficiently can
gather a larger market share, forcing its competitors to cut back.
The very nature of a free market system suggests competition
will increase between the parties involved. The hallmark of a
market-based economy, such as that of the United States, is that
some firms will inevitably fail. 39 The more efficient will succeed,
and the poorly managed will fail, allowing others to take their
place.40 Thus, in theory, an existing airline will be able to suc-
31 Katz, supra note 4, at 88. Not one new airline began operations as a large
passenger air carrier between 1938 and 1978. Id.
32 Id.
33 Federal Aviation Act, supra note 23, § 401 (d), 72 Stat. at 755.
34 Katz, supra note 4, at 93.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Contrast the rapid formation of major airlines after deregulation with the
virtual nonformation of such airlines between 1938 and 1978. Id. at 88.
38 The CAB, which previously set air fares, was abolished and its remaining
duties picked up by the Department of Transportation. Id. at 93.
39 Robert K. Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy" Rules and Social Justice,
1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 9.
- Of the 22 airlines that entered the industry following deregulation, "only
two are now operating. The rest have either gone out of business or merged with
other carriers." COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 33. Since 1985, the market
share of the three largest carriers has risen from 35%-to 56%, with the market
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ceed as long as it is operated and managed efficiently; if it fails, a
more efficient airline will replace it.
It is no surprise that many airlines either sought Chapter 11
protection or completely failed in the wake of deregulation.4'
Aware of the potential consequences, Congress deemed deregu-
lation worth the quest for free markets and lower fares for the
consumer.4 2 The magnitude and frequency of airlines filing
Chapter 11, however, may have come as a surprise.
B. RECESSION AND HIGHER FUEL PRICES
The second major wave of Chapter 11 filings resulted from
the economic pressures brought, on by the worldwide recession
of 1990-91 and the higher fuel prices caused by the Gulf War.43
Throughout the 1980s, a proliferation of corporate mergers and
acquisitions occurred, many financed by highly leveraged debt
including junk bonds.44 The airline industry was no stranger to
this activity. Notorious corporate raider Carl Icahn purchased
TWA in this manner. 45 In addition, numerous other airlines un-
* dertook aggressive expansion plans46 to take advantage of the
booming economy,47 often taking on massive debt to finance
their expansion.48
When the recession hit, airline growth came to a screeching
halt. The resulting debt loads and depressed asset values crip-
pled once profitable airlines.49 As the public tightened its
spending and cut out recreational travel, businesses were also
cutting back on travel. The 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103
share of the eight largest carriers increasing from 74% to 96%. HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 3, at 2, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84.
41 "[O]ver one hundred airlines have now ended up either bankrupt or
merged with other carriers." Katz, supra note 4, at 94.
42 See H.R. REP. No. 1211, supra note 20, at 4, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3739-40.
43 See Stanley Ziemba, America West Joins 3 Other Big U.S. Airlines in Bankruptcy,
CHI. TRiB., June 29, 1991, at Cl.
44 The estimated level of this debt is now more than $35 billion. COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.
45 See TWA Plans to Buy Back Much of Debt; Airline's Offer Meant to Avoid Bank-
ruptcy, WASH. POST, May 16, 1991, at B10.
46 "Between 1988 and 1992, the three largest carriers, American, United, and
Delta, increased their fleets by 445 aircraft." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 2,
1993 U.S.S.C.A.N. 84.
47 Airline traffic grew 43% from 1983 to 1988. Id.
48 Annual interest and rental expenses increased from $2 billion in 1982 to $8
billion in 1991. Id. at 3, 1993 U.S.S.C.A.N. 85.
49 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 12.
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over Lockerbie, Scotland further discouraged air travel.5 ° Con-
sequently, airlines were operating with empty seats, far from be-
ing efficient operators. Airlines that had planned on future
rates of air travel growth consistent with the high rates of the
mid-1980s were faced with the reality of less travel and struggled
to make debt payments.
Meanwhile, the price ofjet fuel more than tripled during this
time due to unrest in the Middle East brought on by Iraq's inva-
sion of Kuwait and the ensuing Gulf War. 1 Higher operating
costs coupled with fewer passengers spelled trouble for the air-
lines. Debt payments which were barely manageable in an ex-
panding economy were now impossible.52 For many airlines,
Chapter 11 provided the only alternative.53 Fledgling airlines
such as Midway and America West filed for, and received, Chap-
ter 11 protection. 4 Continental filed bankruptcy for the second
time within four years.55 Braniff also re-entered.5 6 Pan Am, the
flagship of the American airline industry, entered Chapter 11
and never recovered. Eastern, the nation's oldest airline,
ceased operations.58
The larger number of post-deregulation airlines were chasing
fewer passengers. Competition increased, profits dipped, and
angers flared. Airlines not in Chapter 11 complained that those
afforded the reorganization protection had unfair advantages in
lower operating costs.5 9 Bankrupt airlines responded that the
stronger airlines were taking advantage of their Chapter 11 pre-
dicament, trying to force them out of business by waging airfare
50 HouSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 2, 1993 U.S.S.C.A.N. 84.
51 Fuel prices for jet fuel nearly tripled during the Gulf War build-up before
settling at double their previous price. This increase added about $4 billion to
industry expenses. Id. at 3, 1993 U.S.S.C.A.N. 85.
52 See id. at 2-3, 1993 U.S.S.C.A.N. 84-85:
53 "Indeed the three major airlines with the highest debt/equity ratios, Braniff,
Continental and Eastern, all declared bankruptcy. The fourth highest, Western,
merged with Delta." Jeffrey S. Heuer & Musette H. Vogel, Airlines in the Wake of
Deregulation: Bankruptcy as an Alternative to Economic Deregulation, 19 TRAMSP. L.J.
247, 280 n.213 (1991).
54Midway and America West entered Chapter 11 in 1991. See Ziemba, supra
note 43, at Cl; Paul S. Dempsey, The State of the Airline, Airport & Aviation Indus-
tries, 21 TRANsP. L.J. 129, 173 (1992).
55 See id.
56 See id.
57 Pan Am ceased operations on December 5, 1991. See id.
58 Eastern, which began operations as Pitcairn Aviation on May 1, 1927, ceased
operations on January 18, 1991. See id.
59 See Nomani & O'Brian, supra note 12, at B4.
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wars and cutting into their markets. 61 How did so much blame
focus on Chapter 11, a tool designed to help the public interest?
The specifics of the Bankruptcy Code provide a clue.
III. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE-CHAPTER 11
The United States Bankruptcy Code, enacted in 1978, centers
around Chapter 11 reorganization. 62 The purpose of the Bank-
ruptcy Act is to help financially troubled companies stay in busi-
ness by giving them time to reorganize their finances.6  By
relieving the debtor from its repetition debt, reforming burden-
some contracts, and consolidating its finances, a Chapter 11 re-
organization plan can help return the debtor to the
marketplace as a viable enterprise. 64 In doing so, the Bank-
ruptcy Act provides continued employment to the debtor's
workforce, treats creditors in an even-handed manner, and at-
tempts to ensure a fair return to stockholders on their invest-
ment.65 Overall, the Bankruptcy Code reflects the consistent
interest of Congress over the last sixty years in providing a mech-
anism for a viable transportation system.66
Briefly, a Chapter 11 proceeding is initiated when a struggling
entity files a voluntary petition for Chapter 11 reorganization.6 7
The qualifications to file are not great, and, in fact, almost any
entity can file as long as the filing is in good faith.68 The bank-
ruptcy court, upon accepting the filing, appoints a debtor-in-
possession 69 or a trustee. 70 The entity must then draft a plan for
60 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 4, 1993 U.S.S.C.A.N. 86; see also Juy Acquits
American in Air Price War, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1993, at 1.
61 See Peter S. Greenberg, The Savvy Traveler, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1990, at 2.
62 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994).
63 See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.S.C.A.N. 5963.
64 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 365 (1994).
65 In re Certified Corp., 51 B.R. 768, 768 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1985); see also Heuer
& Vogel, supra note 53, at 257-58.
66 The first legislative enactment dealing with transportation companies in the
context of bankruptcy was the 1933 Amendment to the Bankruptcy Act which
added § 77 specifically for the railroads, which were in financial trouble. Prior to
this time transportation companies,, mainly railroads, had relied on Federal Eq-
uity Receivership. See Bankruptcy Act, ch. 204, § 77, 47 Stat. 1467, 1474 (1933).
67 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
68 Id. § 1129 (a) (3). A filing will be thrown out if it was in bad faith. See infra
note 105.
69 The "debtor-in-possession is generally the best entity to run the business dur-
ing the pendency of the bankruptcy." Heuer & Vogel, supra note 53, at 270.
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reorganization within 120 days.71 However, this 120-day period
is often extended by the court based on requests from the
debtor.72 The reorganization plan is then submitted to the cred-
itors for approval.73 The creditors or other interested parties
can voice their complaints, but each class of creditors must ap-
prove it by a vote.7 4 Once the plan has been accepted, it is con-
firmed by the bankruptcy court, and the debtor begins a new
life. 75
Administratively speaking, this process can take a significant
amount of time. When Chapter 11 filings increase during eco-
nomic downturns, the bankruptcy courts get backlogged. In
corporate America, filings, hearings, meetings, and obtaining ju-
dicial approval take time. Getting numerous unrelated parties,
all with different interests and agendas, to agree on a reorgani-
zation plan is difficult. Because of the length of time it takes to
put a reorganization plan in place, some argue airlines are al-
lowed too much time to "sink or swim."'76 This debate is ana-
lyzed more thoroughly in Part V. 77
A. SECTION 362
For purposes of this Comment, the first key section of Chap-
ter 11 worthy of mention is section 362-the automatic stay pro-
vision.78 This provision creates an automatic stay for all legal
actions affecting the bankruptcy estate. 79 In practice, this provi-
sion is extremely broad and advantageous for debtors. Among
other things, the stay functions to defer debt payments on any
liabilities that arose before commencement of the proceeding.80
70 Normally the debtor stays in control of the assets and business as the debtor-
in-possession. In the case of a corporation, the management would thus stay in
place. A trustee may be appointed, however, where "fraud, dishonesty, incompe-
tence, or gross mismanagement" has occurred or in the best interests of the cred-
itors. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1), (2).
71 Id. § 1121 (b). The 120-day window is exclusively for the debtor. If this time
lapses, creditors and other interested parties may file their own plans. Id.
72 Id. § 1121(d).
73 Id. § 1129(a).
74 Id. § 1126(a).
75 Id. § 1141.
76 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 15.
77 See infra notes 193-202 and accompanying text..
78 11 U.S.C. § 362.
79 Id. § 362(a)(1)-(8).
80 See generally id. § 362(a). But see id. § 1110(a). The Code makes special pro-
visions for the secured creditors of aircraft equipment. Section 1110 is a limited
exception to the automatic stay for the secured creditors of "aircraft, aircraft en-
1026
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A bankrupt carrier only has to make current expense pay-
ments8 1-a significant reduction in its operating costs. Deferral
of debt payments is especially significant to the airline industry
because of the large debt carried by most major carriers. 82
Much of this debt was incurred in the 1980s due to the large
expansion and merger and acquisition activities.83 Because the
airline business is capital intensive, the automatic stay provision
affords ailing airlines significant advantages. Airplanes are ex-
tremely expensive and must be replaced or upgraded relatively
often in comparison to their cost.84 Airlines must often borrow
the money necessary to buy them. When these debts are sus-
pended, it gives the Chapter 11 airline the advantage of lower
operating costs, even if only over the short term. As a result,
section 362 is one of the major sections of Chapter 11 over
which cries of unfair advantage have been heard.85
B. SECTION 365
Section 365 also generates many protests of unfairness. This
section allows the debtor to reject executory contracts on
unexpired leases.86 This specifically helps airlines which tend to
operate a large number of their airplanes through lease pay-
ments. During the mid-1980s expansion, many airlines chose to
obtain new airplanes through leases rather than by outright
purchases.87 By applying the provisions of section 365, airlines
gihe[s], propeller[s], appliance[s] or spare part[s]." Id. The purpose of § 1110
is to "encourage new financing in the transportation industry and to promote
industry modernization of the industry by protecting equipment financiers." See
Glenn S. Gerstell & Kathryn Hoff-Patrinos, Aviation Financing Problems Under Sec-
tion 1110 of the Bankruptcy Code, 61 AM. BANKR L.J. 1, 6 (1987). The creditor may
repossess aircraft equipment without seeking the lifting of the automatic stay. 11
U.S.C. § 1110(a).
81 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
82 The airline industry has $35 billion of debt. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
3, at 2.
83 See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
84 Heuer & Vogel, supra note 53, at 263.
85 See, e.g., infra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
86 11 U.S.C. § 365. In the context of the Bankruptcy Code, an executory con-
tract is " 'a contract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and other
party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to com-
plete performance would constitute a material breach excusing performance of
either.'" See Knutson v. Klinger, 563 F.2d 916, 917 (1966) (quoting Vern Coun-
tryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REv. 439, 460 (1973)).
87 America West, for example, leases 80% of its planes. See Ziemba, supra note
43, at C1.
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in financial trouble can postpone their lease payments. 88 Air-
lines which can postpone their lease payments temporarily gain
unfair operating advantages over airlines which must remain
current on their lease payments. Until 1984 section 365 also in-
volved labor contracts 9 which were treated as any other execu-
tory. contract under section 365. Thus, labor contracts,
including collective bargaining agreements, were subject to re-
jection by an employer immediately upon filing a petition for
reorganization under Chapter 11.90 The holding of NLRB v.
Bildisco & Bildisco,9' the landmark case involving section 365,
confirmed this treatment.
In Bildisco, the Supreme Court held that a collective bargain-
ing agreement should be rejected under section 365 (a) as long
as the debtor shows the agreement burdens the estate and the
equities balance in favor of rejection.9 2 The Court also con-
cluded that the Bankruptcy Code allows the debtor "to deal with
its contracts and property in a manner it could not have done
absent the bankruptcy filing."93 Justice Rehnquist stated that
"the filing of the petition in bankruptcy means that the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement is no longer immediately enforcea-
ble, and may never be enforceable again."94 As a result of
Bildisco, a "bankruptcy court could nullify a collective bargaining
agreement merely upon a showing that the employer could op-
erate more cheaply without it."9" Thus, airline labor agreements
could be rejected immediately upon filing Chapter 11 as long as
management could show that the airline would be better off and
able to operate more cheaply without the labor agreement.
This was not a difficult burden to overcome.
88 See, e.g., In re Airlift Int'l, Inc., 26 B.R. 61, 63 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
89 11 U.S.C. § 1113 was added on July 10, 1984, specifically to deal with labor
contracts. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeships Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, § 1113, 98 Stat. 390-91 (1984). See infranotes 110-20 and accompany-
ing text for further discussion of § 1113.
90 Jonni Walls, Airline Mergers, Acquisitions and Bankruptcies: Will the Collective
Bargaining Agreement Survive, 56J. AIR L. & CoM. 847, 848 (1991).
91 465 U.S. 513, 516 (1984) ("We decide that the language 'executory contract'
in 11 U.S.C. § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code includes within it the collective-bar-
gaining agreements subject to the National Labor Relations Act.").
92 Id. at 526.
93 Id. at 528.
94 Id. at 532.
95 Walls, supra note 90, at 882.
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The Bildisco decision outraged labor unions.9 6 Congress acted
swiftly97 in response to public pressure and submitted an amend-
ment to a pending bankruptcy reform bill, making it more diffi-
cult to unilaterally abrogate a labor contract upon the filing of a
bankruptcy petition. 98 Before the amendment was enacted,
however, enough damage had already been done because some
airlines had used the Chapter 11 provisions to cancel or change
their labor contracts.99
This technique of rejecting labor contracts under the guise of
section 365 led to some of the rhost controversial and outra-
geous uses of Chapter 11 by airlines, eventually resulting in an
amendment to the Bankruptcy Code. 100 The most flagrant ex-
ample of this conduct was by Frank Lorenzo, Chairman of Con-
tinental Airlines, the first time Continental filed for Chapter 11.
On September 24, 1983, Continental filed a voluntary Chapter
11 petition in bankruptcy. 10 1 Immediately after the filing, Conti-
nental terminated two-thirds of its unionized employees, unilat-
erally abrogated its union contracts, and implemented wage and
benefit cuts of fifty percent.10 2 Continental also eradicated sen-
iority and established work rules never before discussed with its
unions.10 3 Three days after the Chapter 11 filing, Continental
resumed operations on its own take-it-or-leave-it terms. 04
The major unions at Continental subsequently challenged the
Chapter 11 filing on the basis that it was in bad faith,10 5 but to
96 For a discussion of labor's reaction to the Bildisco decision, see Mark S. Pul-
liam, The Collision of Labor and Bankruptcy Law: Bildisco and the Legislative Response,
36 LAB. LJ. 390 (1985).
97 " [L] egislation which would have reversed Bildisco was introduced on the very
day the decision was announced." Joseph L. Manson, III & Douglas W. Hall,
Labor Regulations in the Airline and Railroad Industries Under the Bankruptcy Code,
ALI-ABA Course of Study: Airline and Railroad Labor and Employment Law
(1993), available in WESTLAW, C823 ALI-ABA 483 at *487.
98 This amendment was codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1113. See supra note 89.
99 See, e.g., In re Continental Airlines Corp., 38 B.R. 67 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1984);
A.L.P.A. v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 962 (D.D.C. 1988).
100 11 U.S.C. § 1113 was added in response to flagrant abuse of § 365 by cer-
tain airlines.
101 In re Continental,Airlines Corp., 38 B.R. at 69.
102 Walls, supra note 90, at 883-84.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 The initial question interested parties may pose is whether a Chapter 11
case was filed in bad faith. If it is filed in bad faith, the Chapter 11 proceeding
may be dismissed by the bankruptcy court. See Heuer & Vogel, supra note 53, at
260. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (1974) sets forth the requirements that must be met
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no avail.'" 6 The unions also went on strike, perhaps the indus-
try's longest and fiercest since deregulation. 107 The strike ulti-
mately ended with the defeat of the unions. Only twenty
percent of Continental's employees remained unionized as of
December 31, 1987.108 This action was possible due to the bank-
ruptcy laws in place at that time. 10 9
C. SECTION 1113
Unilateral rejection of labor contracts by managers such as
Continental Chairman Frank Lorenzo are no longer possible
under section 1113, the final relevant section of the Bankruptcy
Code." 0 This section regarding labor contracts was enacted in
response to the Bildisco" decision and Continental's treatment
of its employees."' While this section continues to allow debt-
ors some room to ultimately modify existing labor contracts,'"3
the decision cannot be made unilaterally." 4 To use section
1113 to modify labor c6ntracts, debtors must first comply with
the terms and conditions of the statute and get court ap-
before a Chapter 11 reorganization plan may be approved. Section 1129(a) (3)
requires that the plan be proposed in good faith.
106 The Airline Pilots' Association (ALPA), the Union of Flight Attendants
(UFA), and the International Association of Machinist and Aerospace Workers
(LAM) challenged the bankruptcy filing of the airline. The court found that Con-
tinental did not file bankruptcy solely or primarily to modify its collective bar-
gaining agreement. In re Continental Airlines Corp., 38 B.R. at 71.
107 Papaioannou, supra note 7, at 220.
108 Id. at 220-21.
100 Continental was not the first airline employer to use this tactic to rid itself.
of labor obligations. In, 1933 Century Air Lines announced it would carry air
mail at one-half the going rate. It then announced a cut in pilots' pay of $200 per
month. Pilots were ordered to resign and reapply for employment at the new
rate. This led to ALPA's first strike and eventually resulted in a bill submitted
April 1, 1933, to include air transport under the Railway Labor Act. See Mark L.
Kahn, Airlines, in COLLECTrIVE BARGAINING: CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN EXPERIENCE,
315, 339-40 (Gerald G. Somers ed., 1980).
110 11 U.S.C. § 1113. "No provision of this title shall be construed to permit a
trustee [including debtor in possession] to unilaterally terminate or alter any pro-
visions of a collective bargaining agreement prior to compliance with the provi-
sions of this section." Id. § 1113(f).
111 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
112 See 130 CONG. REC. 6247 (1984). "We are all familiar with Continental Air-
lines' recent flagrant abuse of the bankruptcy and labor laws by rejecting its con-
tract ...." Id. (statement of Rep. Florio).
113 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(3) provides: "The court shall approve an application
for rejection of a collective bargaining agreement only if the court finds that...
the balance of the equities clearly favors rejection of such agreement." Id.
114 Id.
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proval.1 15 The statute imposes an affirmative duty on employers
to bargain with the union prior to modifying or rejecting any
contracts or agreements. 116 Essentially, a labor contract can
only be changed if the airline can show the court that the action
is necessary to save the airline from going out of business.1 17 A
court will still apply the "balancing of the equities""' 8 standard
adopted in Bildisco,"9 but the notion that a debtor may unilater-
ally breach a collective bargaining agreement is rejected.120
Section 1113 involving labor contracts is significant because
labor is the largest single operating cost of airlines.12 1 The cost
of labor is often the greatest difference in operating costs be-
tween Chapter 11 and non-Chapter 11 airlines.1 22 For example,
in 1977 the difference in the monthly average cost to employ
one flight captain between major carriers was $467 (between
$6837 and $6370).123 In 1988 a captain employed by American
Airlines earned on average $12,386 per month, while a captain
employed by Continental earned only $5480.124 Continental
15 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b) provides, in part:
(1) Subsequent to filing a petition and prior to an application
seeking rejection of a collective bargaining agreement, the debtor
in possession or trustee (hereinafter in this section "trustee" shall
include a debtor in possession), shall
(A) make a proposal to the authorized representative of the em-
ployees covered by such agreement, based on the most complete
and reliable information available at the time of such proposal,
which provides for those necessary modifications in the employees
benefits and protection that are necessary to permit the reorganiza-
tion of the debtor and assures that all creditors, the debtor and all
of the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably; and
(B) provide, subject to subsection (d) (3), the representative of the
employees with such relevant information as is necessary to evalu-
ate the proposal.
(2) During the period beginning on the date of the making of a
proposal provided for in paragraph (1) and ending on the date of
the hearing provided for -in subsection (d) (1), the trustee shall
meet, at reasonable times, with the authorized representative to
confer good faith in attempting to reach mutually satisfactory modi-
fications of such agreement.
116 Id
117 Walls, supra note 90, at 883.
118 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(3).
119 465 U.S. at 527.
120 Walls, supra note 90, at 884.
121 Richard L. Merrick, The Bankruptcy Dynamics of Collective Bargaining Agree-
ments, 91 COMM. L.J. 169, 170 (1986).
122 Heuer & Vogel, supra note 53, at 273.
123 Katz, supra note 4, at 97.
124 Id.
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achieved this difference of almost $7000 through its bankruptcy
filing. 125
Even with the more restrictive amendment, the Chapter 11
provisions can still be used to great advantage by struggling air-
lines. A large percentage of the major Chapter 11 cases involve
airlines with significant unionized labor.12 6 Airlines that can
show that a change to their labor contracts is necessary to save
the airline may be able to renegotiate their labor agreements
with the unions. Often, just by filing for Chapter 11, an airline
may get concessions from its employees that it would ordinarily
not be able to get under normal circumstances.
D. BANKRUPTCY COURTS
Bankruptcy courts are courts of equity and may issue any or-
der, process, or judgment in order to carry out the Bankruptcy
Code. 12 7 The bankruptcy courts have been given wide power to
decide all "core proceedings" concerning a debtor's estate. 128
These core proceedings are so broad, however, that they encom-
pass nearly every conceivable relationship and function affecting
a debtor. 121 Judges are given wide latitude in accordance with
the Bankruptcy Code.1 30
Several of the panelists brought together by the National
Commission to Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry to
discuss recommendations on bankruptcy reforms point to this
broad discretionary power as a major problem.1 31 One perti-
nent example came from the Eastern Airlines bankruptcy.1 3 2 In
the view of one panelist, "one of the big problems ... was actu-
ally the judge and the bankruptcy bar."1 33 This panelist's view
came from his experience as a member of the Eastern Airlines
creditors' committee.1 34 In this panelist's opinion, the bank-
ruptcy judge saw himself as a "good fairy who wanted to ensure
125 Id.
126 Heuer & Vogel, supra note 53, at 273-74.
127 11 U.S.C. § 105.
128 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (1994).
-2 28 U.S.C. § 157 includes a long, but non-exhaustive, list of possible core
proceedings.
130 Heuer & Vogel, supra note 53, at 258.
131 See, e.g., The Financial Strength and Competitiveness of the Airline Industry, A Look
at the Recommendations On Bankruptcy Reforms and the Tax Burden, 40 FED. B. NEWS
&J. 637, 640-43 (1993) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Reforms].
132 Id. at 640-41.




that all of the poor widows and orphans who lived in Brooklyn
got down to Miami Beach on the tickets that they had bought on
Eastern Airlines, and he was going to keep all of the employees
working" to see this happen. 135 The judge even told the credi-
tors' committee that this "was a public interest issue and that the
creditors really didn't have a lot of business expressing views
about it."136
One does not have to be a bankruptcy expert to raise an eye-
brow to such judicial comments. A plain reading of the Chapter
11 code suggests that creditors are to play a significant role in
the Chapter 11 proceedings. 1 7 Creditors take part in reorgani-
zation plan meetings and must vote their final approval of the
plan. 138 A review of the legislative history of the Bankruptcy
Code makes it clear that part of its purpose is to satisfy the credi-
tors.1 39 A major part of a Chapter 11 proceeding is to have the
creditors accept the reorganization plan.14 When a bankruptcy
judge comments that it is none of the creditors' business while
discussing a Chapter 11 matter,4 one cannot help but question
whether too much latitude has been given to these administra-
tive law judges.
One interesting aspect of the first Continental Airlines bank-
ruptcy was the close ties of the bankruptcy judge to Continental
management. As previously noted, the airline shut down for
three days after filing Chapter 11 in 1983.142 The pilots filed suit
for "furlough pay" attributable to these three days based on
their collective bargaining agreement. 143 The bankruptcy court
granted Continental's motion for summary judgment and val-
ued the pilots' claims at zero."4  Shortly after the bankruptcy
judge granted summary judgment, the judge accepted an offer
for partnership in the law firm representing Continental.1 45
The Fifth Circuit reversed the decision and found that the bank-
135 Id.
136 Id. at 640-41,
137 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121(b), 1126(a).
138 11 U.S.C. § 1126(a).
139 See supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text.
140 Id.
141 See Bankruptcy Reforms, supra note 131, at 640-41.
142 See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
143 In re Continental Airlines Corp., 64 B.R. 882 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986), rev'd,
981 F.2d 1450 (5th'Cir. 1993).
'4 Id. at 890.
145 Law and Motion, Judges-Recusal-Bankruptcy, 8 No. 7 FED. LITGATOR 197,
197 (1993).
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ruptcy judge should have recused himself from the case. The
court noted that the judge had publicly praised Continental's
president and had received an offer of employment from the
very law firm to which the judge had awarded $700,000 in legal
fees the previous day.1 46
Another interesting feature of the bankruptcy process is that
judges defer to the declaring company's management. Conse-
quently, management usually stays on as a debtor-in-posses-
sion; 147 thus, ironically, judges rely on the input and advice of
the same management that failed in the first place. While their
advice is not taken as an absolute and a receiver is appointed by
the court,148 the current management is still given considerable
decision-making power.
It can be argued that this unofficial grant of power takes away
much of the incentive to stay out of Chapter 11 in the first place.
While management may be removed in a Chapter 11 proceed-
ing,149 there is a good chance it will be allowed to stay on and
wield almost as much power. This argument concedes that the
current management knows the most about the airline.150 By
allowing management to stay on with no repercussions, how-
ever, there is less incentive to stay out of Chapter 11 as a way to
cover managerial mistakes.
IV. COMPLAINTS
The debate continues as to how much Chapter 11 has contrib-
uted to the current state of the airline industry. Most concede
that the Bankruptcy Code affords some advantages to Chapter
11 airlines that yield lower operational costs. 15 1 But are these
advantages unfair? It all depends on whom you ask.
A. ARGUMENTS OF AIRLINES NOT IN CHAPTER 11
Robert Crandall, Chairman of American Airlines, has lead the
assault against Chapter 11 airlines.15 2 Most other healthy air-
lines, including United, Delta, and USAir, have joined in the
146 In re Continental Airlines, 981 F.2d 1450, 1462-63 (5th Cir. 1993).
147 See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
148 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(a) (West 1993 & Supp. 1995).
149 A trustee can be brought in, effectively. removing the control of the debtor's
management. In addition, management can always be removed by a vote of di-
rectors. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1), (2) (1994).
150 See supra note 70.
151 See infra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
152 Nomani & O'Brian, supra note 12, at B4.
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chorus, crying unfair competition. 15 Their argument is as fol-
lows: Generally, Chapter 11 carriers do not have to service all of
their debt payments like the other airlines.154 Furthermore,
Chapter 11 carriers can postpone lease payments on airlines; 155
postpone pension payments156 and pension funding;157 and re-
negotiate labor agreements.158 These advantages reduce overall
operating costs by a significant margin.
In such a competitive industry these cost reductions can make
a huge impact. Chapter 11 airlines can either take the cost sav-
ings to build up the bottom line, lower ticket prices in hope of
attracting more passengers, or combine the two strategies. 15 9 In
the airline business, airlines usually match their competitors'
fare changes. Non-chapter 11 airlines argue they are forced to
keep their ticket prices below profitable levels just to compete
with Chapter 11 airlines. 160
B. ARGUMENTS OF AiRINwEs IN CHAPTER 11
Conversely, Chapter 11 airlines argue they are the ones faced
with disadvantages.1 61 After all, they are the ones in financial
difficulty, having been forced to seek bankruptcy to stave off go-
ing out of business. These airlines argue that the healthy air-
lines try to exploit their vulnerability by attacking non-Chapter
11 airline markets.1 62 Continental even initiated a lawsuit
against American Airlines, which was later joined by Northwest,
alleging predatory pricing. 1 6 This lawsuit resulted in a victory
for American, 16 but the fact that the suit was commenced in the
first place and that millions of dollars were spent on legal fees
153 Id.
154 See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
155 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1994).
156 See supra note 81-83 and accompanying text.
157 Id.
158 See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
159 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 4, 1993 U.S.S.C.A.N. 86. The market pres-
sures on Chapter 11 airlines suggest lowering ticket prices to generate more





163 Jury Acquits American in Air Price War, L.A. TIMES, Aug.. 11, 1993, at 1D.
164 Id.
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between' the two sides points to the seriousness of the
allegations.' 65
Airlines in bankruptcy argue they are hurt by resorting to
Chapter 11.166 They point out that they must cancel flights, tick-
ets, and in some cases stop operating for a few days. 67 Conse-
quently, they lose customer confidence and passengers to the
healthy airlines.168 The negative publicity also hurts. They are
also placed under the additional scrutiny and control of the
bankruptcy courts. The future of Chapter 11 airlines is in the
hands of their creditors since the airlines cannot be released
from Chapter 11 until all of their creditors agree on a reorgani-
zation plan. 169
C. WHAT IS THE TRUTH?
Amidst the rhetoric offered by both sides, the truth is hard to
decipher. A conclusive study which quantified the effects of
Chapter 11 on the remaining airlines has yet to be done. 170 Cer-
tainly the provisions of Chapter 11 make it easier for an airline
to operate under its protection. Indeed, that is part of the pur-
pose behind its enactment.' 71 It is generally conceded that
Chapter 11 has contributed to the financial problems of the in-
dustry,17 2 but there are other significant causes as well. As men-
tioned earlier, factors such as deregulation, recession, terrorist
bombings, and fluctuating fuel prices have all done their share
to make it difficult to run an airline. 73 While no one has deter-
mined to what extent Chapter 11 airlines have contributed to
165 American spent more than $20 million and employed three law firms to
defend itself. Id.
166 See Nomani & O'Brian, supra note 12, at B4.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 11 U.S.C. 1126 (1994).
170 The witnesses from George Washington University to the Aviation Subcom-
mittee of the Committee on Public Works and Transportation testified that they
have done a mathematical study of the effects of bankrupt carriers on the indus-
try, but the study has not been published. See HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 5,
1993 U.S.S.C.A.N. 87.
171 The purpose of Chapter 11 is to help businesses regain their health by re-
structuring debt, reforming burdensome contracts, consolidating finances-in
short, temporarily easing business pressures. See supra notes 62-65 and accompa-
nying text.
172 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 15.
173 See supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
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the financial woes of the airline industry, bankrupt air carriers
are definitely a factor'a74
V. TO CHANGE OR NOT TO CHANGE: A SAMPLING
OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Due to the high profile of airline bankruptcies, potential
Chapter 11 reforms are invariably included in discussions re-
garding the state of the American airline industry. Conse-
quently, various opinions and recommendations have surfaced
over the last few years. A few of these are summarized below.
A. Ti-E NATIONAL COMMISSION TO ENSURE A STRONG
COMPETITIVE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
The National Commission to Ensure a Strong Competitive
Airline Industry (National Commission) was established at the
end of the 102d Congress. The National Commission gave "the
President and Congress expert, objective advice on the financial
crisis now facing the airline industry and the recent decline in
industry competition."175 The National Commission's mandate
was to "investigate, study and make policy recommendations
about the financial health and future competitiveness of the
United States airline and aerospace industries," and to report its
findings ninety days after appointment of the commissioners. 76
The report was released in August 1993 under the tide,
"Change, Challenge and Competition" (Commission Report).7
While the National Commission's analysis and recommenda-
tions covered a broad spectrum of issues facing the airline in-
dustry, the issue of bankruptcy received more attention than
174 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 15.
175 HouSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 1, 1993 U.S.S.C.A.N. 83.
176 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at ii. The National Commission's mem-
bership consists of 15 voting and 11 non-voting members. Five voting members
were appointed by the President, five by the Senate leadership, and five by the
House leadership. The National Commission is bipartisan, with members ap-
pointed from "among individuals who are experts in aviation economics, finance,
international trade and related disciplines and who can represent airlines, pas-
sengers, shippers, airline employees, aircraft manufacturers, general aviation and
the financial community." Id.
177 The commissioners were appointed by Congress and President Clinton on
May 24, 1993. The National Commission submitted its recommendations to the
President and Congress on August 19, 1993, two days before the deadline. Id. at
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almost all others. 178 The National Commission recognized that
the operation of bankrupt carriers is one of many factors behind
the airline industry's financial problems. 179 Although the Na-
tional Commission never chose sides as to the fairness of airline
bankruptcies, it acknowledged both sides of the bankruptcy ar-
gument stating, "[W]hile Chapter 11 protection does provide
some cost advantages, such as suspension of debt payments, it
can also lead to reduced consumer (especially business flyer)
confidence, marked loss of traffic and reduced revenues."' 80
The, National Commission sympathized with Chapter 11 airlines
by acknowledging the substantial costs for professional fees, the
time and attention diverted from top management, as well as
the cost of doing business with suppliers on a cash-up-front
basis.18 1
The fact that airline bankruptcies take too long, however, was
also clear to the National Commission.182 It blamed much of
the heated debate regarding airline bankruptcies on the Bank-
ruptcy Code noting that "[t]here is little question that compre-
hensive [B]ankruptcy [C]ode reform is overdue, and the
Commission urges the Congress to begin such a review
promptly. 1 88
Recognizing that bankrupt airlines face difficult financial hur-
dles that affect not only the airlines but also the general public
and the industry as a whole, the National Commission made a
number of specific recommendations which include the
following:
1. Subject to judicial review, bankruptcy judges should make
findings in individual cases on whether to grant an extension of
the 120-day reorganization limit.'84 A one-year absolute limit
should be imposed on a bankrupt airline's exclusive right to file
its reorganization plan. 8 5
178 The Commission Report discusses the need for efficiency and technology
superiority, the need for financial strength (including bankruptcy, tax policies,
new entrants, and work forces), and the need for international operations in a
global economy. Id. at 6-27.
179 Id. at 15.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id. The National Commission also acknowledged that the same can be said






2. The time period for bankrupt airlines to assume or reject
their leases for scarce airport gates should be limited., 6 These
public assets should not be tied up and under utilized for exten-
sive periods of time to the detriment of surrounding communi-
ties and the traveling public.18 7
3. Government bodies, such as the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation and airports, should be allowed to sit on the credi-
tors' committee.1 8 8
4. Provisions in the Bankruptcy Code with respect to aircraft
leases should be clarified,18 9 making it easier for the lessor to
lease to other airlines. Concern by lessors about potential im-
pacts of bankruptcy should be allayed, allowing other airlines to
obtain better lease terms for aircraft.' 90
5. The Secretary of Transportation should have statutory per-
mission to participate directly in bankruptcy proceedings. 191
B. CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS
AND TRANSPORTATION
Prior to the establishment of the National Commission to En-
sure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry, the House Commit-
tee on Public Works and Transportation explored the same
problems addressed by the National Commission.9 2 The Com-
mittee's Aviation Subcommittee held hearings during the 102d
Congress to gather information from more than thirty expert
witnesses.19  The hearings covered the airline industry's
problems and the advantages and disadvantages of various gov-
ernmental actions to aid the industry.194 A "major area of disa-
greement among the expert witnesses concern [ed] the extent to
which airlines in Chapter 11 bankruptcy are responsible for the







192 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 1, 1993 U.S.S.C.A.N. 83.
193 Three days of supplemental hearings were also held on February 16, 17,
and 24, 1993. Expert witnesses "included the Department of Transportation, air-
lines of all sizes, employee representatives, passenger representatives, airports,
aircraft manufacturing companies, persons adversely affected by aircraft noise,
and financial experts." Id. at 1-2, 1993 U.S.S.C.A.N. 83-84.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 4, 1993 U.S.S.C.A.N. 86.
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One theory advanced by some of the largest airlines and other
experts is that carriers in Chapter 11 are the main culprits re-
sponsible for financial problems in the industry since bankrupt
carriers are not required to make debt payments on debts and
are able to renegotiate their union contracts. 196 Those in favor
of this theory advocate dealing with the below-cost pricing of
Chapter 11 carriers. 197 Proposed remedies include: "requiring
[the Department of Transportation] to revoke the certification
of Chapter 11 carriers on the grounds [of unfitness]; time limits
on how long a carrier can stay in Chapter 11; and limits on the
rights of Chapter 11 carriers to initiate fare reductions." 198 The
large carriers also voiced opposition to additional foreign invest-
ment in United States carriers, especially when the foreign gov-
ernment involved does not grant satisfactory rights in return. 199
In the subcommittee hearings, the Chapter 11 airlines and
other experts disputed these contentions and opposed the pro-
posals. They argued that the need to make cash payments and
consumer resistance would offset any cost savings. °200 They also
denied being initiators of fare reductions and argued that the
main problem in the industry was overcapacity, which was cre-
ated by the "Big 3 "1201 carriers' addition of 445 aircraft to their
fleets between 1988 and 1992 when demand growth was flat.20 2
As a result of the hearings, the Aviation Subcommittee identi-
fied certain questions which will need to be explored in the fu-
ture. One question related to bankruptcy is how much does
entering Chapter 11 reduce an airline's costs and to what extent
are any reductions offset?203 The Aviation Subcommittee discov-
ered that no party or expert witness had quantified the effects of
Chapter 11 on the airline industry.20 4 So, the Subcommittee
recommended further analyses and studies to measure in quan-
tifiable, economic terms how bankruptcy affects the industry as






201 United, American, and Delta comprise the "Big 3."





ers2 °5 The Subcommittee also recommended analysis of setting
fares and the motivation of airlines in setting fares.2 6
C. VOICES AGAINST CHANGE
While some experts are calling for reform of the Bankruptcy
Code, at least as it pertains to airlines,2 °7 others still argue that
bankruptcy serves the airline industry well. Jeffrey Heuer and
Musette Vogel are two authors who support this alternative
view.2 08 Their argument, however, is placed in the context of
bankruptcy as an alternative to governmental regulation of the
airlines, the situation prior to the Airline Deregulation Act of
-1978.209 The argument is that bankruptcy, rather than direct
government regulation, more adequately serves the airline in-
dustry.210 Three reasons are given for this opinion:
First, the bankruptcy courts are without power to affect those air-
lines which have succeeded in the deregulated era. Second, the
courts have greater power and more flexibility to especially reha-
bilitate a failing airline. Third, bankruptcy courts, as courts of
general equity, will more adequately balance the interests of the
debtor-airline, creditors, employees, government, airline industry
and the public." 211
Despite standing against regulation, this argument concedes the
need for some government intervention and help. Otherwise,
the free market will "chew up and spit out the airlines daring
enough to enter the market."212 Bankruptcy is offered as a bet-
ter alternative to regulation due to the reasons stated above and
the fact that bankruptcy courts are quick to respond and are
considered more flexible and equitable than an administrative
agency, while not as intrusive.2 1 3 It is the "proper forum to han-
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 See, e.g., COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 15.
208 Heuer & Vogel, supra note 53, at 249.
20 Deregulation Act, supra note 20.
210 Heuer & Vogel, supra note 53, at 249.
211 While a valid argument, the first reason stated ignores the indirect power
bankruptcy courts do hold over successful airlines. By their decisions, bank-
ruptcy courts decide if and how long an airline will be in bankruptcy. Airlines in
bankruptcy have certain operating advantages over their healthier rivals. Thus,
bankruptcy courts are able to wield some influence over airlines not under their
direct jurisdiction.
212 Id. at 255.
213 Id. at 260
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dle rapid growth and an equally rapid attrition of the many new
entrants into the airline industry."2 1 4
Heuer and Vogel note that numerous parties receive the ben-
efits of bankruptcy.215 The public is benefitted by lower air fares
and better service. 16 Due to competition, airline management
must think aggressively and innovatively.217 Labor, through an
increase in efficiency and participation, can take a more active
role in corporate matters; creditors are able to recover their
debt through a single forum; and government resources are
more properly directed at enforcing consumer protection and
antitrust laws than running an administrative agency.21 8
The authors also suggest the airline industry as a whole is bet-
ter off under the bankruptcy forum. 219 The airline industry, just
like individual airlines in bankruptcy, "goes through a painful,
cathartic period," and in the end, airlines emerge leaner and
profitable.122 0 These authors suggest that the bankruptcy forum
facilitates the change of an airline's structure while allowing the
industry to function.221
The authors suggest that "[w]here deregulation has failed,
bankruptcy has adequately filled the gap. It has kept some air-
lines flying and sold off the effective parts of airlines that could
not stay afloat" 222 Through attrition, the most inefficient air-
lines have been lost.22 3 In the view of these authors, the worst
times are behind the airline industry.224 They concede that per-
214 Id. at 256. Unfortunately, the two airlines the authors cited as successful
models of the bankruptcy forum, Midway and Continental, were chosen prema-
turely. Midway was cited as "an example of building an airline through bank-
ruptcy liquidation or sale of assets pursuant to a reorganization plan" (much of
Midway's growth was due to purchases from bankrupt airlines, namely, Air Flor-
ida). Id. at 279. As noted earlier, Midway went bankrupt in 1991 and never re-
covered. See supra note 6. Continental was cited as a bankruptcy success. Heuer
& Vogel, supra note 53, at 282. This success, however, related to Continental's
first bankruptcy and re-emergence. Continental had yet to file for bankruptcy a
second time when this article was published. See supra text accompanying note 7.
215 Heuer & Vogel, supra note 53, at 279.
216 Id. at 260.
217 Id.
218 Id. The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) which had performed most of the
agency functions during regulation was abolished as a result of the Airline Dereg-
ulation Act of 1978. See supra notes 23 and 38.
219 Heuer & Vogel, supra note 53, at 278.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 286.
223 Id. at 285.
224 Id.
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haps a few more airlines may be subjected to bankruptcy due to
"mismanagement, high costs, poor service, or ineffi-
ciency, "221 but "[t]he lion's share of reorganization, liquidation,
merger and consolidation has taken place. 226 In the view of
Heuer and Vogel, bankruptcy has "balanced the interests of all
concerned, including the government and the public . . .
produc [ing] positive results on a larger scale."22 7 In contrast to
the National Commission 2 8 and the Aviation Subcommittee, 9
Heuer and Vogel suggest leaving the bankruptcy forum as is.230
To them bankruptcy is an excellent forum iri the era of deregu-
lation and "does not and will not trample the ability of strong
airlines to effectively run their business. '"231
D. NEUTRAL OPINIONS
Some authors have chosen to take the middle ground regard-
ing the use of the bankruptcy forum and recommending
changes. In essence, they are not impressed with the current
Bankruptcy Code, but do not advocate drastic changes either.
For example, Robert K. Rasmussen, while conceding some
problems with the current bankruptcy system, notes that it is
"part and parcel" of the American economy.23 2 The operation
.of a market-based economy such as that of the United States,
with ownership of private property, "directly implicates bank-
ruptcy law. The hallmark of such an economy is that some firms
inevitably fail."233 "[A] bsent some form of nonmarket subsidiza-
tion, [the result] is eventual bankruptcy."23 4 "Any economic sys-
tem which often results in corporate insolvency needs a way to
deal with these failures." 23 5 "Bankruptcy law performs that func-
tion."23 6 Some firms may be both efficient in the long run, but
"in the short run [may] be unprofitable and unable to receive
interim financing." 23 7 Bankruptcy provides an adequate forum.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 286.
?28 See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
2- See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
230 Heuer & Vogel, supra note 53, at 260.
231 Id. at 286.
232 Rasmussen, supra note 39, at 10.
233 Id. at 9.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id. at 10.
237 Id.
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It allows an otherwise strong company to survive short term cash
shortages, outliving economic downturns.2 38 "[I] t determines
the fate of the financially troubled firm and allocates who gets
what when there are not enough assets to go around." 3 9
VI. CONCLUSION
The evidence as to how badly the use or abuse of Chapter 11
has hurt the airline industry has not been quantified. It is con-
ceded by most that Chapter 11 does have some effect on the
overall state of the industry and does give airlines under its pro-
tection some unfair advantages, mainly the reduction of operat-
ing costs.
It is also conceded that the airline industry's problems are not
caused by the proliferation of Chapter 11 litigation. Deregula-
tion, recession, and international politics have played a major
role in the success or failure of airlines. These problems will still
exist and plague the industry regardless of Chapter 11. The use
of Chapter 11 by a significant number of airlines during times of
crisis, however, only adds to the struggle and has caused bad
blood between the competitors.
The public interest pressures related to airline bankruptcies
are enormous. Public policy plays an important role, both in
the initial bankruptcy legislation and also in interpreting the
Bankruptcy Code. When an airline struggles, thousands of em-
ployees are affected, which in turn affects the cities in which
they live and work. Consequently, pressure is placed on con-
gressional, judicial, and other governmental representatives to
keep the airline operating. This public pressure is manifested in
the Bankruptcy Code, the partial purpose of which is to keep
businesses operating.2 14 One specific goal is to provide continu-
ous employment to the debtor's workforce.2 41
Congress has admitted that it does not want airlines to fail.
The National Commission's report stated, "We want to do every-
thing possible to preserve the jobs of the 73,000 employees of
carriers now in Chapter 11. We need these carriers as competi-
tors to preserve the benefits of deregulation. 242 The irony of
this statement cannot be lost on those who consider deregula-
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 See 11 U.S .C: §§ 1101-1330 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
241 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
242 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 3, 1993 U.S.S.C.A.N. 85.
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tion to be at the heart of the airline industry's problems. As
stated earlier, the overall goal of deregulation is to restore com-
petitive capitalism to the airline industry.2 43 Minimal govern-
ment involvement is one of the tenets of any capitalist structure
where regulation is replaced by free market control.
In the wake of deregulation, the federal government (both
courts and Congress) has remained deeply involved in the air-
line industry through the long reach of the Bankruptcy Code.
Despite one's feelings whether Chapter 11 is good or bad for
the airline industry, it is incontrovertible that Chapter 11 is an
artificial device, used to prop up a business and keep it operat-
ing when it would have otherwise failed under market condi-
tions. In effect, Congress has substituted one artificial control-
regulation-for another, Chapter 11 protection. Instead of let-
ting the market forces alone decide which airlines will survive or
fail, the federal government has kept its hand in the air travel
industry. Such action seems to be at odds with the stated pur-
poses behind deregulation.
This Comment opened with the news that no major airlines
are now in Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. Perhaps now is
the time to decide what reforms, if any, should be made to the
Bankruptcy Code as it concerns airlines. With no major airlines
in Chapter 11, discussions can proceed under less political scru-
tiny and prejudice caused by the differing industry opinions and
agendas.
243 Gesell & Farris, supra note 18, at 108.
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